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CURRENT DECISIONS
courts may not be as quick to label the plans as illegal per se without
first attempting the significant economic analysis that is required by
the "rule of reason" approach.
NICHOLAS JOHN DERoMA
Constitutional Law-THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE AND PROPERTY
TAX EXEMPTIONS FOR RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS. Walz v. Tax Con-
mission, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
In Walz v. Tax Commission' the appellate taxpayer sought to have
provisions of New York State's Constitution' and Code3 allowing church
property exemption from real and personal property taxes declared in
violation of the establishment clause4 of the United States Constitution.
The taxpayer argued that exemption of church property indirectly re-
quired him to "make a contribution to religious bodies.... ." ' The state
courts upheld the tax exemptions," and their rulings were affirmed upon
appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States.
Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion declared that a literal inter-
pretation and strict application of the establishment clause was impos-
sible because it conflicts with the free exercise clause.- Strict and com-
plete application of both would "defeat the basic purpose of... [the]
provisions, which... [was] to insure that no religion be sponsored or
favored, none commanded, and none inhibited." 8 The Court deter-
mined that the establishment clause did not require complete neutrality
on the part of the government; for the authors of the establishment
clause sought only to prevent "sponsorship, financial support, and active
involvement of the sovereign in religious activity." 9 Finally, while
admitting that tax exemption benefited churches, the Court found the
S.E.2d at 446. Although the Justice Department is not bound by the views stated in
the letter, the court in Blue Cross refused to give the letter any weight. Id.; AarnmuvsT
& TRADE REG. REP., supra note 18.
1. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
2. N.Y. CONST. art. 16, § 1.
3. N.Y. REAL PROPERTY TAx LAW § 420 (McKinney Supp. 1970-71).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. I: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion .... "
5. 397 U.S. at 667.
6. Walz v. Tax Commission, 30 App. Div. 2d 778, 292 N.Y.S.2d 353 (1st Dept, Sup.
Ct. 1968), aff'd, 24 N.Y.2d 30, 246 N.E.2d 517, 298 N.Y.S.2d 711 (1969).
7. 397 U.S. at 668-69. U.S. CoNsr. amend. I: "Congress shall make no law ... pro-
hibiting the free exercise [of religion] ... "
8. 397 U.S. at 669.
9. Id. at 668.
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exemption did not amount to government sponsorship. "There is no
genuine nexus between tax exemption and establishment of religion....
The exemption creates only a minimal and remote involvement between
church and state. . . ," 'o In arriving at these interpretations of the
establishment clause, the Court relied upon the long history of the
church property tax exemption in America" and its universality among
the fifty states.'
2
Walz is the first Supreme Court decision which deals specifically
with the establishment clause and property tax exemptions for churches.
In the past, the Court has declined to consider several exemption cases,3
although decisions have been rendered in several important establish-
ment clause cases involving non-tax aid.' 4 The first, Everson v. Board
of Education,15 found that a state statute reimbursing parents for trans-
portation expenses incurred in sending their children to private schools
did not violate either the fourteenth amendment 6 or the establishment
clause.' 7 The establishment clause was held to insure only state neu-
trality "in its relations with groups of religious believers and non-be-
lievers... [and not to] require the state to be their adversary." 18 State
payment of school transportation costs was deemed analogous to state
payment of police and fire protection expenses.
Everson was shortly followed by McCollum v. Board of Education9
which held that state provisions for instruction of religious subjects in
public school buildings were unconstitutional even though the teachers
were not compensated from public funds. "Pupils compelled by law
to go to school for secular education are released in part from their
legal duty upon the condition that they attend... religious classes. This
is beyond all question a utilization of the tax established and tax sup-
10. Id. at 675-76.
11. Id. at 676-77.
12. Id. at 676.
13. Murray v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 241 Md. 383, 216 A.2d 897, cert. denied,
385 U.S. 816 (1966); General Finance Corp. v. Archetto, 93 R.I. 392, 176 A.2d 73 (1961),
appeal dismissed, 369 U.S. 423 (1962); Lundber v. County of Alameda, 46 Cal. 2d 644,
298 P.2d 1, appeal dismissed, 352 U.S. 921 (1956).
14. For a detailed dicussion of the establishment cases before Walz, see Note, The
Establishment Dilenmna: Exemption of Religiously Used Property, 4 SUFFOLK U. L.
REv. 433 (1970).
15. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
16. Id. at 5-8.
17. Id. at 8-18.
18. Id. at 18.
19. 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
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ported public school system to aid religious groups to spread their
faith." 20
Four years later, in Zoracb v. Clauson,21 the Court approved the
state action allowing public school students to leave school during the
day to receive religious instruction in non-public buildings. Justice
Douglas, writing for the majority, stated that the first amendment
requires "complete and unequivocal" separation of church and state,
but nevertheless found that separation in "all respects" is not neces-
sary.22 A common sense interpretation of the establishment clause was
deemed necessary to prevent governmental hostility toward religion.
The clause was interpreted as not requiring governmental neutrality; it
only barred direct financial assistance, governmental "religious instruc-
tion," or any blending of "secular and sectarian education [or] use of
secular institutions to force one or some religion on any person." 23
The establishment decision immediately preceding Walz was Engel v.
Vitale,24 the school prayer case. Required reading of an interdenomina-
tional prayer in public schools was declared to be a governmentally
fostered religious activity "wholly inconsistent with the Establishment
Clause." 25
There appear to be two basic, and somewhat extreme, views as to the
requirements of the establishment clause.26 It might be interpreted as
barring only the establishment of an official state church or discrimina-
tion in favor of one or some religions over others. Or it might be inter-
preted as barring aid to religious organizations entirely. The Supreme
Court has indicated an unwillingness to bar all governmental aid, but
it has prohibited aid provided in too direct a manner. Not unexpectedly,
therefore, exactly which aid is permissible is still uncertain in areas in
which there are no cases directly in point.
Although past cases have failed to establish workable guidelines, 7
Waz now serves to clarify the area of property tax exemption.2
20. Id. at 209-10.
21. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
22. Id. at 312.
23. Id. at 314.
24. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
25. Id. at 424.
26. C. PmrrcHmrr, TnE AmE ACAN CONsnrriON 567-68 (2d ed. 1968).
27. An injunction was issued recently by a federal district court which halted state
payments to private schools, all of which happened to be religious, for salaries of teachers
of non-religious subjects. DiCenso v. Robinson, 316 F. Supp. 112 (D.R.I. 1970). This
case may also find its way to the Supreme Court.
28. One federal district court has already decided a property tax case on the basis
of Walz. Diffenderfer v. Central Baptist Church, 316 F. Supp. 1116 (S.D. Fla. 1970).
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Churches receive other tax exemptions, however, about which there
are no definitive Supreme Court cases. These include exemptions from
death and gift taxes at the state level,29 exemption from income tax-
ation at both the state30 and federal3' levels, and exemption from sales
and other excise taxes. 2 On the basis of Walz, it appears that these
areas of exemption would be upheld if they are ever considered by the
Court.
JAMES W. CORBITT, JR.
Constitutional Law-DEATH PENALTY AS CRUEL AND UNUSUAL
PUNISHMENT FOR RAPE. Ralph v. Warden, No. 13,757 (4th Cir., Dec.
11, 1970).
On January 18, 1961, the petitioner was convicted of rape, and
sentenced to death in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County,
Maryland.' In appealing the dismissal of a habeas corpus petition, he
contended that the death penalty, under the circumstances, constituted
cruel and unusual punishment as proscribed by the Constitution. 2 Re-
versing the conviction, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit held that the eighth amendment's prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment forbids Ralph's execution for rape, since
his victim's life was neither taken, nor endangered. 3
29. Note, Constitutionality of Tax Benefits Accorded Religion, 49 COLUM. L. REv.
968, 974 (1949).
30. Id. at 979.
31. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 501(c) (3).
32. Note, supra note 29, at 981.
1. This unreported case was noted in Ralph v. State, 226 Md. 480, 481, 174 A.2d 163,
164 (1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 813 (1962). The state of Maryland authorizes capital
punishment for a person convicted of the crime of rape. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 461
(Rep1. Vol. 1971) provides:
Every person convicted of a crime of rape or as being accessory thereto
before the fact shall, at the discretion of the court, suffer death, or be sen-
tenced to confinement in the penitentiary for the period of his natural life,
or undergo a confinement in the penitentiary for not less than eighteen
months nor more than twenty-one years; and penetration shall be evidence
of rape, without proof of emission.
2. Ralph v. Warden, No. 13,757 (4th Cir., Dec. 11, 1970), rehearing denied, (4th
Cir, Mar. 1, 1971). The issue of whether the imposition of the death penalty on a
convicted rapist constitutes cruel and unusual punishment was raised by the same
petitioner in this court in 1964. Ralph v. Pepersack, 335 F.2d 128, 141 (4th Cir. 1964).
In that case the court found no Supreme Court decision to support such a contention,
and refused to act favorably upon it.
3. Ralph v. Warden, No. 13,757 at 2 (4th Cir., Dec. 11, 1970).
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